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21 Introduction
Since Kaldor (1934) and Coase (1937) economists are interested in the
equilibrium and the nature of the firm. To what extent should economic activity
be organized within a firm? What is the boundary or optimal size of the firm?
What fractions of economic transactions should be carried out on markets? One
crucial aspect of the nature of the firm is its growth rate. Is it true that Gibrat’s
Law holds: growth of the firm is irrespective of the size of the firm? In this paper
we analyze a particular aspect of this topic: how does uncertainty affect the
growth of the firm? The interest for the impact of uncertainty is raised by the
recent advances of the literature on the investment-uncertainty relation (see Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994). Uncertainty can lead to an increase of firm activity if
managers are risk neutral and firms are operating under perfect competition. On
the other hand with risk aversion and market power it is likely that uncertainty
hampers growth. Investment in fixed assets is one indicator of firm growth. We
use two additional variables, employment growth and expected maturity of the
firm, to extend the analysis of the impact of uncertainty on general firm growth.
Although we use these two additional indicators our main attention is directed to
the investment decision.
The sign of the investment-uncertainty relation has attracted both theoretical and
empirical attention in the last decades. Whereas the sign is ambiguous from a
theoretical point of view, most empirical studies provide support for a negative
effect of uncertainty on investment (see for instance Aizenman and Marion, 1993,
Bell and Campa, 1997, Caballero and Pindyck, 1996, Ferderer, 1993a,  Ferderer
1993b, Leahy and Whited, 1996,  Pattillo, 1998, Pindyck, 1986,  Pindyck and
Solimano, 1993, and Price, 1996). The sign as well as the size of the effects not
only depends on the theoretical assumptions made, but is also contingent on
econometric issues and data availability.
3Most studies use historical data to proxy future uncertainty. However, it is likely
that an ex post measure of uncertainty does not reflect entrepreneurs’ subjective
perception of risk. To come around this problem, Guiso and Parigi (1999)
proposed to proxy the firms’ perception of risk by using results of an interview
study. Managers of firms are asked for their subjective ideas on the variability of
future demand for their products. Pattillo (1998) uses a similar strategy in her
study on the investment-uncertainty relationship for Ghana. In this paper we
follow a similar approach for Dutch firms. More specifically, we interview Dutch
firms about their investment plans, their expectations regarding future sales,
expected return on investment, employment growth, the financial position, etc. in
order to investigate whether uncertainty has a positive or negative effect on firm
growth in general and investment in particular. We proxy firm growth using three
variables: investment, growth of the number of employees and maturity of the
firm. Moreover we have information on the financial positions of the firms (like
solvability, current Return on Assets (ROA), and demand for external financing).
This implies that we can test for financial imperfections. A special feature of our
study is that we can use specific information on types of investment for the
largest investment undertaken. This allows to be more precise on the nature of
investment decisions.
The survey contains 1097 records of firms on the plant level. We include firms of
various sizes. The majority of the firms have less than 100 employees, which
indicates that we address a small firm’s growth decision. The survey was carried
out in 1999. Before we discuss the survey more extensively, we present in Section
2 a short survey of the literature on investment and uncertainty. The insights from
this literature are valid for other growth indicators as well, so we concentrate on
the investment literature to a large extent. Section 3 explains the interview study,
including the measurement of indicators of uncertainty. Section 4 presents the
estimation results. Section 5 analyses the special cases of the impact of financial
structure and firm size. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
42 The impact of uncertainty
We review the basic insights of the investment-uncertainty relation. We do not
explicitly focus on a discussion of the employment decision of the firm. The
investment decision is mostly taken under genuine uncertainty. Some economists
believe that the investor is tortured by fundamental uncertainty (Knight, 1921),
which implies that the investor is not able even to give a subjective probability
function of all possible outcomes. This might easily lead to the well-known
Keynesian animal spirits in investment. For modelling purposes the Knightian
uncertainty is killing though, so we abstract from fundamental uncertainty. Here
we do assume that the investor is able to formulate a density function of all
outcomes, which implies that the investor can analyse future prospects of the
investment project.
In discussing investment models we restrict ourselves to dynamic investment
models that can be derived from a microeconomic optimisation exercise. It is
about 40 years ago that the first microeconomic dynamic investment models were
presented (see Jorgenson, 1963, Eisner and Strotz, 1963, and Gould, 1968). We
distinguish between two classes of dynamic investment models under uncertainty.
The first class includes models that assume that investment is reversible, while
the second class assumes investment to be at least partly irreversible. The latter
class includes the more recent so-called real option models. The choice of
presenting the literature in this way is rather subjective, since there are numerous
alternative ways to do so as will become clear from the following list of crucial
characteristics that influence the sign of the investment uncertainty relationship:
1 The degree of product market competition. If an entrepreneur faces imperfect
competition there is a greater likelihood that uncertainty will affect
investment negatively.
2 The degree of returns to scale. With increasing returns to scale the
entrepreneur will dislike uncertainty more, since there are decreasing marginal
costs.
53 The degree of risk aversion. Risk loving entrepreneurs will react positively on
more uncertainty.
4 Irreversibility of investment. An investor who faces high costs of reverting
investment will probably not invest and wait until more information is
revealed to the market.
5 The possibilities to obtain external credit. The probability of a negative
investment-uncertainty relationship increases the more a firm is financially
constrained.
We first discuss the models without costly reversibility of investment. Leland
(1972) and Sandmo (1971) are the first studies that relate uncertainty and the
level of output with the risk attitude of the entrepreneur for both demand and
price uncertainty respectively. They show that risk-averse firms have a negative
sign of the investment-uncertainty relation. The analysis of both Leland and
Sandmo are static though. Hartman (1972) includes adjustment costs and
considers the case with perfect competition, constant returns to scale and risk
neutrality. This setting is the common setting for a popular class of investment
models, the Q-theory. The Q-theory is basically a model that discounts all future
expected dividends into the current value of the firm and compares this financial
value with the replacement cost of capital. Hartman’s analysis leads to a
traditional but counterintuitive opinion on the effect of uncertainty on investment,
namely a positive relationship (see also Abel, 1983). If the adjustment cost
function is symmetric, under conditions of perfect competition and constant
returns to scale, the marginal product of capital is a convex function of
uncertainty variables. Therefore the higher the uncertainty, the higher the
marginal productivity of capital will be. This encourages the firm to invest more.
Caballero (1991) argues that the positive correlation between investment and
uncertainty based on the Hartman-Abel prediction is traceable to the assumptions
of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. So the positive relationship
between investment and uncertainty seems to be an exception rather than a rule.
Apparently the risk attitude of the entrepreneur is an important element. Nickell
6(1978) analyses a model with a mean-variance setting of the value of the firm. He
shows that this assumption changes the Hartman results into a negative sign of
the investment-uncertainty relation.
The second or more modern class that emphasises the role of uncertainty in
investment decisions is the theory of costly reversibility of investment. The
irreversibility property of investment is relevant to explaining investment
behaviour only when investment decisions are made under uncertainty. Within
the framework of irreversibility investment opportunities are modelled as the firm
holding call options on real assets. The firm has the right but not the obligation to
buy the sequence of cash flows that are generated by the investment project in the
future by paying a certain amount of investment costs. The key assumptions of
the real option approach to investment behaviour are irreversibility and the
possibility of delay to invest. The irreversibility property of investment implies
that the firm has no chance to regret the outcome of the state once the investment
decision has been made. If investment decisions are irreversible, investment will
be more sensitive to uncertainty facing the firm. Since the firm that has more
irreversible capital has a higher opportunity cost of capital (including the option
value of investing right now), the firm will require a higher marginal revenue
product of capital to match the trigger of investment. Therefore waiting is highly
demanded to obtain new information. Consequently uncertainty directly affects
the threshold that triggers the occurrence of investment, through which it affects
the timing decision of investment and hence the scale of investment at a specific
point in time (Bernanke, 1983, McDonald and Siegel, 1986, Pindyck, 1991, Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994).
The above-presented short survey of the literature illustrates that the investment-
uncertainty relationship is still far from clear. Similar arguments hold for the
other firm factor demand equation: the labour decision. The main difference
between the investment and hiring decision is the nature of reversibility (although
labour market regulation might also lead to irreversibility of hiring).
73 The survey
This paper uses data from an annual survey among a panel of Dutch firms. The
survey is organized by the Department of Spatial Sciences of the University of
Groningen. In the 1999 edition of this survey we added a number of questions on
investment, employment growth, and expected uncertainty. The main topic of the
survey is the analysis of location strategies. The survey was mailed to 1,967 panel
members, of which 903 (45.9%) responded. In order to compensate for the
“death” of panel member, unwillingness to continue panel participation, and
retirement or job change of the contact person, another 2,695 firms were mailed
in a second round of the survey. The latter resulted in 197 questionnaire forms or
a response rate 7.3%, which is more in line with response rates on written
questionnaires amongst private firms. Due to missing values not all of the 1,100
observations are useful. The question on sales expectations, a crucial item for our
paper, had a response rate of 85%.
It is good to note that data are collected on the level of individual firm
establishments as opposed to the company or other organisational level. This
makes this survey valuable for the analysis of investment and growth, because the
plant manager is most likely responsible for the investment decisions. The sectors
strongly represented in the research group include industry (29%) and business
services (22%), followed by wholesale (17%) and construction (15%). Smaller
segments include retail and restaurants (10%) and transport and communication
(6%). Agricultural business and government agencies are not included. Moreover,
the survey includes only a relative small number, 5%, of very small firms (less
then 5 employees). Almost one out of every five firms has over 100 employees.
We have three indicators of growth of the firm in the survey. First, we have for
1998 data on investment, more specifically on:
1. Total investment;
82. Investment in dwellings;
3. Investment in fixed assets excluding dwellings;
4. The percentage of total investment used for replacement;
5. The largest investment project;
6. The nature of the biggest investment (expansion of dwellings, expansion of
other fixed assets, replacement of other fixed assets, introduction of new
technology, or investment in Information and Communication Technology
(ICT)).
The second growth indicator of the firm is its expansion of demand for labour.
We know the number of employees in 1995 and 1999. The third indicator is the
maturity of the firm as perceived by the manager. We distinguish 8 possible states
of the maturity of the firm, from birth, growth, stability, to slowdown after
consolidation, steady growth, etc. Table 1 gives in three panels descriptive
statistics on firm growth. Panel A gives investment data, Panel B the employment
data, while Panel C illustrates the maturity of the firm. The investment data show
that the sample is skewed with an overrepresentation of small firms. This is
confirmed by the data on the distribution of employment. One can observe that
large investment projects take a relative large fraction of total investment. The
nature of the investment is mostly replacement instead of expansion. If firms
expand it is in dwellings and not in fixed assets (at least for the largest project
undertaken). Panel B shows that about 60 per cent of the firms have less than 50
employees. Employment growth is rather big. Panel C shows that most firms are
rather optimistic concerning growth possibilities. There is a shift from stability to
growth.
Next we turn to the financial soundness of the firm. We have the following
information in the data: solvability (percentage of equity of total assets),
judgement of current profitability, percentage of external finance of the largest
investment project, and the problems of attracting external finance. Table 2 gives
the descriptive statistics. Table 2 shows that the average solvability of firms is 35
to 40%. For the largest investment project 30 per cent of the firms tried to attract
9external finance. This is a remarkably low percentage, which indicates that firms
tend to use internal finance. Internal finance is more likely to be available in a
boom of the business cycle (which was true in 1998-1999). If they did attract
external finance the fraction of external finance was large, namely a little under
80%. There is a significant negative correlation between solvability and external
financing (partial correlation coefficient is –0.25). Most firms are happy with the
current profitability, while only a very few firms did have trouble in external
financing the investment project. This fact is again due to the boom of the
business cycle in the Netherlands in 1998-1999.
Next we turn to measuring uncertainty. In line with Guiso and Parigi (1999) and
Pattillo (1998) we have asked entrepreneurs about their expected sales in 2002
vis-à-vis sales in 1998. For each expected change in sales presented in Table 3
entrepreneurs are requested to provide the likelihood of the change on a scale of
0-100. Hence, firms give a density forecast of expected sales.  The answers to this
question are used to proxy the conditional mean and variance of the growth rate
of sales 3 years ahead.  In order to do that, we assume that the central values of
the open intervals more than 20% and less than 20% are 50 and 30 percent,
respectively. The distribution is assumed to be uniform within the intervals.
The conditional mean (CMEAN) and the conditional variance (CVAR) are
measured by:
CMEAN = (1+de)S0
CVAR = vare (S0 )2
S0 are sales in the base year (1998), and de and vare are the expected mean and
variance of the growth rate of sales computed from the answers given in Table 3.
The coefficient of variation of expected sales (COEFV) is a proxy for uncertainty.
It is defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean of the distribution:
10
COEFV=√ CVAR/CMEAN. Table 4 gives a frequency distribution of COEFV for
all firms that have completed the questionnaire. In the remainder of this paper we
will use the COEFV as well as the ratio of the conditional variance and the
conditional mean CVAR/CMEAN. We label this ratio COEFV2. Guiso and Parigi
(1999) use this ratio as well since it allows for more variation.
A second variable that carries information on expected uncertainty is expected
return on the largest investment project. We have information on the expected
mean of return on investment (ROIMEAN), the expected lower bound (ROILOW)
and the upper bound (ROIHIGH). We assume that the density function is uniform
between high and low and compute the variance by ROIVAR = (ROIHIGH-
ROILOW)2/12. We compute COEFVROI =√ROIVAR/ROIMEAN, and
COEFVROI2= ROIVAR/ROIMEAN. Table 5 gives the descriptive statistics for
the uncertainty variables. Panel A of Table 5 presents the data for sales
uncertainty, Panel B for uncertainty of return on investment. As can be seen by
comparing the mean and the median, the distribution of all variables is skewed.
4 Model Specification and Estimation Results
In this section we present models that correlate growth of the firm with
uncertainty. We have three indicators of growth of the firm: investment, growth
of the number of employees, and the expected phase of maturity of the firm. We
include two indicators of uncertainty: sales uncertainty and the uncertainty of
return on investment. We discuss the three growth indicators each at a time.
We include two types of models. First we include regular equations that explain
the level of investment. Secondly, we estimate investment choice models: what is
the probability that the firm invests at all? These two approaches can lead to
conflicting results. It might be so that firms are stimulated to invest, but at a lower
level if uncertainty is prominent. So including both models might enhance our
understanding of growth decisions.
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4.1 Investment
Investment is our main indicator of growth of the firm. The literature offers a
wide range of investment models. The majority of these models cannot be used
though, because our survey does not include balance sheet information. This
excludes for instance the use of Tobin’s Q. Moreover we have no information on
the dynamics of investment (no information on adjustment costs), which seriously
limits our class of applicable models. We therefore estimate a simple reduced-
form accelerator type of investment model including an uncertainty term. The
expected change in the sales represents future profitability of the firm. The model
is specified as follows:
INV=a1 DSAL + a2 UNC+a3 (1)
where INV is the ratio between a certain measure of  investment and sales. DSAL
is the ratio between the change in sales (measures as the conditional mean of
sales, CMEAN, minus the 1998 value of sales) and sales. UNC is the uncertainty
proxy. All variables are scaled by sales to avoid heteroskedasticity (moreover we
use the White-corrected standard errors). A usual possibility to come around the
heteroskedasticity problem is to scale all variables with the value of the capital
stock. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the capital stocks for the
firms in our sample, so that we decided to scale all variables by sales.
Table 6 presents the first set of results. We include four definitions of investment:
1) INV1 refers to the total value of investment;
2) INV2 refers to investment in dwellings;
3) INV3 refers to investment in machinery;
4)   INV4  refers to the largest investment project of the firm.
Note that  INV1=INV2+INV3. We exclude extreme observations by assuming
that INVi/SALES<0.5, for i=1,…,4.. We include two indicators of uncertainty:
sales uncertainty and uncertainty with respect to Return on Investment (ROI). For
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both variables we include the coefficient of variation and the conditional variance
over the conditional mean. The latter definition allows more variance. Note that
Guiso and Parigi proxy uncertainty by by the conditional variance (and not the
standard deviation) of the form CVAR/K, where K is the value of the capital
stock.
What can be concluded from Tables 6? First we note that the uncertainty
variables defined by the conditional variance over the conditional mean perform
by far better than the coefficient of variation (the latter is not significant in any
regression). This is in line with the results of Guiso and Parigi (1999). Secondly,
the accelerator model is relevant in all regressions. Thirdly, the disaggregation of
total investment into separate equations for investment in dwellings and
investment in machinery does not improve the fit of the model. Fourthly, the sales
uncertainty variable affects investment decisions more than the ROI uncertainty.
And lastly, uncertainty has a negative impact on the size of investment, no matter
what the type of investment is.
In Table 7 we present results from the estimation of a logit-specification. We
define the dependent variable to be equal to 1 if the firm invests, and to be zero in
other cases. This type of modelling is an approximation of the discrete investment
choice. Table 7 again includes the four investment types: total investment,
investment in dwellings, investment in machinery, and the largest investment
project. We use again a simple accelerator specification. Since Table 6 shows that
the conditional variance of expected sales gives the best results we only use
COEFV2 as a proxy of uncertainty. Table 7 shows that uncertainty with respect to
future sales has a negative effect on investment (total, machinery, and largest
investment project), but has a positive impact on the decision to invest in
dwellings. The group of firms that does not invest in dwellings is relatively large
(compared to the other investment categories). A priori it does not seem likely
that investment in dwellings is not subject to irreversibility. It might be
troublesome to sell firm-specific buildings. Since investment in dwellings is less
13
common, it is likely that the threshold idea applies. As Sarkar (2000) shows an
increase in uncertainty increases the probability of hitting the threshold (which
itself depends on uncertainty), which would stimulate investment to a certain
extent. To summarize, the results of the logit-estimation confirm generally the
negative impact of uncertainty on investment.
For the largest investment project undertaken we have more information. We
know the type of investment and the financing of investment for this class (see
Section 5.1 for the latter aspect). Here we analyze the type of investment. Table 8
presents results for:
• INVED: Expansion of dwellings;
• INVEM: Expansion of machinery;
• INVRM: Replacement of machinery;
• INVNT: New production technology;
• INVICT: Information and communication technology.
We use the sales uncertainty measure again in the form of the conditional
variance over the conditional mean of expected sales (COEFV2). Panel A of
Table 8 shows again that we find support for a negative relation between sales
uncertainty and the level of investment (for all types). For some of the investment
categories the number of observations is low though. Panel B shows the logit
regressions for the binary investment choices (for investment in new production
technology the number of observations is insufficient). Here it is remarkable that
if we find a significant effect of uncertainty on binary investment choices it has a
positive sign. This holds for expansion of machinery and ICT investment. So
again this might hint at the observation that more uncertainty may lead to a higher
probability of reaching the investment hurdle. Again we note that the number of
observations is low.
The general conclusion from the investment regressions is that sales uncertainty
has a negative impact on the level of investment and the decision to invest. Only
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for dwellings and large projects on expansion in machinery or ICT we find a
positive impact of uncertainty on reaching the investment hurdle.
4.2 Employment growth
Next we turn to the other factor demand: labour. The growth of employment can
be seen as a second indicator of firm growth. Suppose that we start from the
notion that the long-run labour-output ratio is constant. In that case we can use an
accelerator equation for labour demand. We use the following form:
DEMPL/SALES = a0 DSAL/SALES + a1 UNC +a2 INV/SALES +
intercept
where DEMPL is the difference between the number of employees on January
1999 and January 1995. DSAL is again the expected change of sales, UNC is an
uncertainty measure. We include investment in the equation to test for
complementarity of production factors, which might be true if we assume a fixed
long-run capital to income ratio as well.
Table 9 presents estimation results for the employment equation. We include the
four measures of uncertainty: two for sales uncertainty (COEFV and COEFV2)
and ROI uncertainty (COEFVROI and COEFVROI2). Table 9 reveals that again
the COEFV2 gives the best results. It is clear that the higher uncertainty with
respect to expected sales, the lower the employment growth is. The uncertainty of
the return on investment is less relevant. The accelerator is a significant
determinant as well as the investment indicator of complementarity of labour and
capital. So both factor demands seem to be negatively influenced by sales
uncertainty.
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4.3 Maturity of the firm
Next we estimate the probability that the firm expects to grow. In Table 1 we
presented the indicators of maturity of the firm. They stretch out from the birth
and start of the firm to consolidation after a slump. We concentrate first on the
unconditional expectation of the maturity. We estimate a logit model on the
probability that the firm answers that it expects to grow, independently of the
previous phase of maturity. We use the accelerator again to correct for the impact
of expected future profitability. Moreover we include our four measures of
uncertainty. Table 10 presents the results. Table 10 shows that the expected
probability of growth of the firm is positively influenced by the conditional
variance of sales expectations COEFV2. The other uncertainty measures are not
found to be significant. This is a remarkable finding, since our previous results on
factor demands show the opposite results. It should be noted here that our
expected maturity measure is a rather subjective variable: it expresses growth
expectations. Apparently growth expectations are positively correlated with sales
uncertainty expectations. These expectations need not to be in line with actual
factor demand decisions though.
Next we turn to conditional probabilities of growth. So for each of the three
growth phases we include only those observations that have a current maturity of
the firm that naturally proceed the growth phase. So for phase 2 we include phase
1, for phase 4a phase 3 and for phase 5d phase 4c. Our uncertainty measure is
COEFV2 throughout. Table 11 includes the results. The results show that starting
firms might suffer from sales uncertainty, while more mature firms expect to
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benefit from sales variance. Again it is good to note that the number of
observations is low.
Concluding this section we note that in general factor demands are decreased by
higher expected sales uncertainty. So the growth rate of the firms is lower the
higher sales uncertainty is. A higher sales uncertainty though seems to coincide
with a little more optimism on the future maturity of the firm. This might lead to
the conclusion that the probability of reaching the subjective investment hurdle
might be higher due to the optimistic impression of growth possibilities.
5 The impact of financial structure and size of the firm
In the previous section we analysed the impact of sales and ROI uncertainty on
investment, employment growth, and expected maturity development of the firm.
The main conclusions are that especially the conditional variance to mean ratio
affects investment, labour demand and expected maturity of the firm. In this
section we proceed to analyse investment, labour demand and expected maturity
and sales uncertainty. We analyse the impact of financial structure and size of the
firm. It might be that firms in financial problems behave differently from healthy
firms. It might also be true that small firms behave differently. We first discuss
the financial structure, next we analyze the size effects.
5.1 Financial structure
We have two general indicators of financial structure available: solvability and
current return on assets. Moreover for the largest investment project we know the
percentage of external finance and the trouble in getting finance for about 30
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percent of the firms. We therefore proceed with estimating logit equations for the
largest investment project, employment demand (we use 4 employees as a cut-off
rate) and probability of growth of the firm using COEFV2 and financial
indicators. We use a cut-off rate for solvability of 30 per cent on the lower bound
and 40 per cent on the upper bound (median value is 35 per cent). Table 12 gives
estimation results for the three equations. Panel A describes the results for the
low solvability firms. Here we see that investment demand is reduced through
uncertainty, but the employment and expected phase of maturity of the firm show
more growth due to sales uncertainty. So here we might observe that investment
is more affected by irreversibility than the labour demand decision. For high
solvability firms we observe that all uncertainty has positive value for the
decision to factor demands. Apparently these firms are able to take the risk of
expansion a little more. Panels C and D show results for the same logit-models
for low and high current profitability. Firms with high current return on assets are
more likely not to invest, but hire more workers if sales uncertainty increases.
Firms with low profitability invest more with a higher sales uncertainty. Firms
with a high current return on assets are more reluctant to invest.
Table 13 gives the results for investment and external financing. We include two
types of regressions. The first two results relate to the fraction of external finance.
Note that 278 of the 1097 firms reported that they used external finance for their
largest investment project. For those firms who reported that they used external
finance we split the sample into a class that used less than 80 percent and a class
that used more than 80 percent external finance for their largest project.  Here we
see that uncertainty has a positive impact on firms that invest and do not
externally finance investment by more than 80 per cent. Firms that do use large
external financing sources show no impact of uncertainty. We also include two
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results for firms reporting problems in attracting external finance. There is no
serious distinction between these two classes. This again confirms the notion that
problems in attracting external finance are not influential and do not interfere
with the investment-uncertainty relation.
5.2 Size
Next we analyse the impact of firm size. Table 14 gives the logit-regressions for
investment, labour demand, and expected maturity for large and small firms. We
split firms into classes based on the number of employees (less than 50 or greater
or equal to 50). Table 14 again shows that the probability to invest decreases for
small firms if sales uncertainty increases, while the demand for employees is
positively influenced. For large firms we find that all factor demand is stimulated
by an increase in sales uncertainty.
This result is somewhat in contradiction with the general notion that young small
firms are risk neutral and are operating in highly competitive markets, which
would make them to depend positively on sales uncertainty. For older, more
mature firms the opposite would hold. Here we find basically the same result for
small firms as for firms with a low solvability. In our sample larger firms have a
lower solvability though (the median solvability for firms with more than 50
employees in 1995 is 32.5% as opposed to 35% for the whole sample). So smaller
and low solvability firms seem to suffer from an increased sales uncertainty.
In general we can argue that there is no complete clear picture that emerges from
the analysis of firm size. This is in line with Gibrat’s Law: firm growth is
independent of firm size.
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6 Conclusions.
In this paper we analyze the relation between growth of the firm and uncertainty.
A special feature of the study is that it uses data from a survey amongst a panel of
1097 Dutch firms. This allows us to measure uncertainty ex ante. We develop two
indicators of uncertainty: sales uncertainty and uncertainty with respect to Return
on Investment (ROI). We proxy growth of the firm by various forms of
investment, employment growth, and the expected phase of maturity of the firm
(is there any future growth expected?).
We conclude that uncertainty measured by the conditional variance over the
conditional mean of expected sales has a significant impact on growth decisions
made by firm managers. For investment we mainly find a negative impact of
uncertainty. There are some cases that we find support for a positive impact of
sales uncertainty on the decision to invest, but a negative impact on the level of
investment. For employment decisions we find a negative impact of sales
uncertainty. Finally for the subjective impression of the expected maturity of the
firm we find a positive correlation between sales uncertainty and the probability
of growth.
Finally, we conclude that low solvability and a high current return on assets make
it more likely that the firm will respond negatively in its investment decision to an
increase in sales uncertainty. Smaller firms also have a lower probability to invest
if uncertainty increases.
For future research it is useful to get more insight into investment dynamics. This
requires that we use the same survey for the analysis of future decisions of the
firms. Moreover we are able to track the forecasting ability of the managers and
see whether managers show learning behaviour.
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Table 1 – Growth of the firm: Descriptive statistics
Panel A – Investment data (million guilders)
Mean Median σ
Total investment 2.062 0.350 6.649
Investment in dwellings 1.681 0.000 26.354
Investment in fixed assets 1.403 0.247 7.139
Replacement investment (%) 57.436 60.000 32.025
Expansion (%) 41.729 40.000 31.792
Largest investment project 1.399 0.204 5.406
Nature of largest investment project (percentages of total):
- Expansion of dwellings 14.7
- Expansion of fixed assets 2.5
- Replacement of fixed assets 21.3
- Introduction of new technology 2.1
- ICT 29.7
- Other 19.7
Panel B – Employment data
Mean Median σ
Number of employees 1995 87.586 30.000 255.163
Number of employees 1999 102.059 35.000 318.569
Growth rate 1995-1999 29.703 14.286 75.513







Panel C – Maturity of the firm
Phase of growth (in percentages)
1998 Expectation in 2000
Phase 1 Start 2.28 0.50
Phase 2 Growth 18.33 18.51
Phase 3 Stable 23.36 14.55
Phase 4a Growth after stability 23.55 34.26
Phase 4b Extended stability 16.52 17.43
Phase 4c Decline 5.70 2.48
Phase 5d Stability after decline 5.41 3.47











Table 2 – Financial soundness of the firm
Mean Median σ
Solvability (%) 40.587 35.000 26.726
External finance (%, for n=278) 77.229 80.000 23.949
Current profitability (n=1064, %)
- too low 19.27
- reasonable 31.95
- good 42.86
- not applicable 5.92




- a few 38.75
- very few 33.21
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Table 3 – Subjective density of expected growth of sales
Sales development 1998-2002 Probability









Decrease of more than 20%
Total amount of points 100
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Table 4 - Frequency Distribution of the coefficient of variation
The conditional mean (CMEAN) and the conditional variance (CVAR) are measured by:
CMEAN = (1+de)S0
CVAR = vare (S0 )2
S0 are sales in the base year (1998), and de and vare are the expected mean and variance
of the growth rate of sales computed from the answers given in Table 3. COEFV is
defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean of the distribution: COEFV=√
CVAR/CMEAN.











Table 5 – Descriptive statistic of uncertainty variables
Panel A – Sales uncertainty
CMEAN = (1+de)S0
CVAR = vare (S0 )2
S0 are sales in the base year (1998), and de and vare are the expected mean and variance
of the growth rate of sales computed from the answers given in Table 3. COEFV is
defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean of the distribution: COEFV=√
CVAR/CMEAN. COEFV2 = CVAR/CMEAN.CMEAN, CVAR in million guilders, COEFV
and COEFV in percentages. Number of observations is 841.
Mean Median σ
CMEAN 68.079 12.485 459
CVAR 6.76E+5 6.32E+5 1.84E+7
COEFV 0.767 0.166 1.031
COEFV2 127 0.477 1590
Panel B – Uncertainty of Return on Investment (ROI)
ROIMEAN = expected return on investment;
ROILOW = expected lower bound of return on investment;




Number of observations is 304.
Mean Median σ
ROIMEAN 21.671 15.000 21.055
ROILOW 14.285 10.000 17.476
ROIHIGH 29.648 20.000 26.228
ROIVAR 39.304 8.333 154.964
COEFVROI 0.259 0.217 0.179
COEFVROI2 1.420 0.817 2.615
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Table 6 – Investment under uncertainty
The model estimated reads:
 INVi/SALES=a1 DSAL/SALES + a2 UNC + intercept
where i=1,..,4 and UNC is the uncertainty measure. INV1  = total value of investment;
INV2 = to investment in dwellings; INV3 = investment in machinery; INV4  = largest
investment project; DSAL = CMEAN-sales in 1998, F is F-value, R2 is the adjusted
determination coefficient. White-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The
sample is restricted to INVi/SALES<0.5.
Panel A – Sales uncertainty measured by COEFV
INV1 INV2 INV3 INV4
DSAL 0.077 0.045 0.035 0.072
(0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020)
COEFV -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Intercept 0.053 0.016 0.040 0.036
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.017 0.011 0.004 0.022
F 7.597 4.981 2.541 8.805
# observations 744 749 755 697
Panel B – Sales uncertainty measured by COEFV2
INV1 INV2 INV3 INV4
DSAL 0.079 0.050 0.038 0.071
(0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018)
COEFV2 -0.288 -0.121 -0.208 -0.160
(0.062) (0.036) (0.044) (0.069)
Intercept 0.053 0.017 0.040 0.035
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.028 0.014 0.014 0.026
F 11.724 6.181 6.365 10.347
# observations 744 749 755 697
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Panel C – Return on Investment uncertainty measured by COEFVROI
INV1 INV2 INV3 INV4
DSAL 0.091 0.046 0.062 0.084
(0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028)
COEFVROI 0.010 0.004 0.008 -0.007
(0.003) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Intercept 0.051 0.015 0.039 0.039
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
R2 0.020 0.005 0.010 0.022
F 3.790 1.573 2.464 4.211
# observations 281 285 286 277
Panel D – Return on Investment uncertainty measured by COEFVROI2
INV1 INV2 INV3 INV4
DSAL 0.091 0.046 0.061 0.085
(0.033) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028)
COEFVROI2 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Intercept 0.056 0.017 0.042 0.040
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
R2 0.020 0.005 0.011 0.031
F 4.171 1.647 2.584 5.372
# observations 281 285 286 277
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Table 7 – Investment under uncertainty: logit specification
The model estimated reads:
 Prob(INVi=1)=a1 DSAL/SALES + a2 COEFV2 + intercept
where i=1,..,4 and UNC is the uncertainty measure. INV1  = total value of investment;
INV2 = to investment in dwellings; INV3 = investment in machinery; INV4  = largest
investment project; DSAL = CMEAN-sales in 1998, LL is the loglikelihood.  Sales
uncertainty measured by COEFV2: the conditional variance
INV1 INV2 INV3 INV4
DSAL 0.769 1.383 0.360 0.769
(0.750) (0.462) (0.932) (0.750)
COEFV2 -0.878 7.230 -0.917 -0.878
(0.153) (3.100) (0.158) (0.153)
Intercept 1.784 -0.390 2.222 1.784
(0.150) (0.101) (0.186) (0.150)
LL -371.19 -519.26 -305.86 -371.19
# Prob(INVi)=0 135 402 99 135
# observations 842 762 842 842
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Table 8 – Largest investment types of investment
Panel A – Least squares
The model estimated reads:
 INVj/SALES=a1 DSAL/SALES + a2 COEFV2 + intercept
where j = ED (expansion of dwellings), EM (expansion of machinery), RM (replacement of
machinery), NT (new technology), or ICT (Information and Communication Technology), and
COEFV2 is the conditional variance os expected sales over the conditional mean of expected
sales; DSAL = CMEAN-sales in 1998, F is the F-value, R2 is the adjusted determination
coefficient. White-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is restricted to
INVj/SALES<0.5.
INVED INVEM INVRM INVNT INVICT
DSAL 0.180 0.111 0.016 0.012 0.008
(0.063) (0.035) (0.032) (0.113) (0.006)
COEFV2 -0.697 -0.638 -0.366 -0.581 -0.042
(0.248) (0.534) (0.126) (0.229) (0.012)
Intercept 0.064 0.028 0.044 0.070 0.013
(0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.029) (0.002)
R2 0.097 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.007
F 5.761 6.512 1.002 0.481 1.701
# observations 90 99 157 18 213
Panel B – Logit specification
INVED INVEM INVRM INVNT INVICT
DSAL -1.120 -0.882 -0.564 -    2.232
(1.922) (2.093) (2.577) -      (1.053)
COEFV2 -1.080 10.700 -7.860 -     9.730
(1.290) (3.900) (7.180) -      (2.430)
Intercept 3.077 2.769 3.087 -    2.978
(0.634) (0.622) (0.538) -      (0.450)
LL -28.070 -27.543 -37.758 -    -36.156
# Prob(Invj=1) 8 8 10 -    9
# observations 106 100 166 - 222
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Table 9 – Labour demand and uncertainty
The model estimated reads:
 DEMPL/SALES=a1 DSAL/SALES + a2 UNC + a3 INV/SAL + intercept
Where DEMPL is the difference between employment on January 1999 and January
1995; SALES represents sales in 1998, DSAL is the differences between the expected
sales mean for 2002 and actual sales in 1998, UNC is an uncertainty measure, INV is
total investment. F is the F-value, R2 is the adjusted determination coefficient. White-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
COEFV COEFV2 COEFVROI COEFVROI2
DSAL 0.210 0.213 0.150 0.143
(0.066) (0.064) (0.120) (0.119)
UNC -0.002 -0.257 0.056 0.004
(0.008) (0.101) (0.068) (0.003)
INV/SAL 0.243 0.239 0.257 0.259
(0.684) (0.068) (0.090) (0.091)
Intercept 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.018
(0.013) (0.012) (0.004) (0.025)
R2 0.062 0.063 0.065 0.065
F 17.146 17.482 7.641 7.628
# observations 739 739 287 287
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Table 10 – Unconditional maturity of the firm
We estimate that the firm is either in phase 2, 4a or 5d. The model reads:
Prob(Phase = 2, 4a, or 5d) = a1 DSAL/SALES + a2 UNC
Where SALES represents sales in 1998, DSAL is the differences between the expected
sales mean for 2002 and actual sales in 1998, UNC is an uncertainty measure. LL is the
log-likelihood.
COEFV COEFV2 COEFVROI COEFVROI2
DSAL 2.382 2.823 3.309 3.119
(0.460) (0.400) (0.848) (0.733)
UNC 0.060 0.758 0.133 0.046
(0.073) (0.309) (0.471) (0.041)
LL -553 -553 -187 -187
# Prob(phase=0) 355 355 107 107











 Table 11 – Conditional maturity of the firm
We estimate that the firm is either in phase 2, 4a or 5d. The model reads:
Prob(Phase = 2, 4a, or 5d | Previous phase) = a1 DSAL/SALES + a2
COEFV2
Where SALES represents sales in 1998, DSAL is the differences between the expected
sales mean for 2002 and actual sales in 1998, UNC is an uncertainty measure. LL is the
log-likelihood.
Phase 1 Phase 3 Phase 4c
DSAL 7.186 5.081 4.354
(1.392) (1.546) (2.848)
COEFV2 -0.355 0.162 -0.221
(0.170) (0.084) (1.160)
LL -6.167 -112 -33.6
# Prob(phase=0) 7 70 28
# observations 20 186 52
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Table 12 – Financial structure of the firm
Panel A – Low solvability firms (Solvability<30 per cent)
We estimate that the firm invests in a large project, hired more than 4 additional
employees or expects to enter a growth phase. The model is of the type:
Prob(INV4,DEMP, Phase =1) = a1 DSAL/SALES + a2 COEFV2
Where INV4=1 if the firm notifies a large investment, DEMP=1 if the difference
between the number of employees in 1999 and 1995 is over 4 (the median value), and
Phase=1 if the firm reports that it expects to grow in two years. SALES represents sales
in 1998, DSAL is the differences between the expected sales mean for 2002 and actual
sales in 1998, COEFV2 is the uncertainty measure. LL is the log-likelihood.
INV4 DEMP Phase
DSAL 5.541 0.035 2.528
(1.157) (0.556) (0.675)
COEFV2 -0.774 1.580 0.719
(0.150) (0.209) (0.165)
LL -131 -160 -153
# Prob(x=0) 46 121 102
# observations 233 233 233
Panel B – High solvability firms (Solvability>40 per cent)
INV4 DEMP Phase
DSAL 7.706 0.034 3.286
(1.803) (0.686) (0.970)
COEFV2 2.950 1.490 0.304
(0.666) (0.681) (0.494)
LL -113 -161 -153
# Prob(x=0) 33 114 94
# observations 236 236 236
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Panel C – Low current return on assets
We estimate that the firm invests in a large project, hired more than 4 additional
employees or expects to enter a growth phase. The model is of the type:
Prob(INV4,DEMP, Phase =1) = a1 DSAL/SALES + a2 COEFV2
Where INV4=1 if the firm notifies a large investment, DEMP=1 if the difference
between the number of employees in 1999 and 1995 is over 4 (the median value), and
Phase=1 if the firm reports that it expects to grow in two years. SALES represents sales
in 1998, DSAL is the differences between the expected sales mean for 2002 and actual
sales in 1998, COEFV2 is the uncertainty measure. LL is the log-likelihood.
INV4 DEMP Phase
DSAL 5.141 -0.508 2.949
(0.980) (0.489) (0.594)
COEFV2 3.300 0.445 -0.082
(0.505) (0.632) (0.299)
LL -245 -298 -283
# Prob(x=0) 71 264 193
# observations 431 431 431
Panel D– High current return on assets
INV4 DEMP Phase
DSAL 6.897 1.894 2.775
(1.058) (0.461) (0.559)
COEFV2 -0.808 1.160 0.092
(0.151) (0.233) (0.023)
LL -206 -272 -264
# Prob(x=0) 62 195 159
# observations 404 404 404
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Table 13 – External finance
We estimate that the firm invests in a large project. The model is of the type:
Prob(INV4 =1) = a1 DSAL/SALES + a2 COEFV2
Where INV4=1 if the firm notifies a large investment. SALES represents sales in 1998,
DSAL is the differences between the expected sales mean for 2002 and actual sales in
1998, COEFV2 is the uncertainty measure. LL is the log-likelihood.
Less than More than Problems No problems
80% 80%
DSAL 9.655 8.770 6.603 7.475
(2.593) (3.347) (3.472) (2.168)
COEFV2 4.120 2.170 7.100 3.660
(0.967) (1.870) (2.500) (1.580)
LL -37.5 -43.3 -29.7 -69.9
# Prob(x=0) 7 4 5 9
# observations 113 90 63 158
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Table 14 – Size of the firm
Panel A – Small firms (number of employees less than 50 in 1995)
We estimate that the firm invests in a large project, hired more than 4 additional
employees or expects to enter a growth phase. The model is of the type:
Prob(INV4,DEMP, Phase =1) = a1 DSAL/SALES + a2 COEFV2
Where INV4=1 if the firm notifies a large investment, DEMP=1 if the difference
between the number of employees in 1999 and 1995 is over 4 (the median value), and
Phase=1 if the firm reports that it expects to grow in two years. SALES represents sales
in 1998, DSAL is the differences between the expected sales mean for 2002 and actual
sales in 1998, COEFV2 is the uncertainty measure. LL is the log-likelihood.
INV4 DEMP Phase
DSAL 7.668 3.609 4.286
(1.456) (0.812) (0.822)
COEFV2 -0.073 0.067 0.058
(0.020) (0.029) (0.025)
LL -136 -169 -162
# Prob(x=0) 33 107 113
# observations 266 266 266
Panel B – Large firms (number of employees more than 50 in 1995)
INV4 DEMP Phase
DSAL 5.474 -0.274 2.214
(0.859) (0.401) (0.476)
COEFV2 2.650 1.390 -0.001
(0.985) (0.656) (0.559)
LL -305 -375 -266
# Prob(x=0) 95 327 228
# observations 545 545 545
